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Overview 
In an Opinion delivered on 3rd May 2018 in the case C-207/16 Ministerio Fiscal (‘Ministerio 
Fiscal’), Advocate General (AG) Saugmandsgaard Øe proposed that criminal offences that are 
not particularly serious may justify in certain cases disclosure of electronic communications 
metadata.  The AG’s Opinion might come as a slight surprise to privacy advocates after the 
seminal decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) in Digital Rights 
Ireland (C-293/12 and 594/12) (‘Digital Rights’), Schrems (C-362/13) and Tele2 and Watson 
(C-203/15 and C-698/15) (‘Tele2’). Yet, a more careful reading of the AG’s Opinion does not 
reveal a rupture from the previous line of the CJEU’s surveillance case-law; it merely states 
that there could be certain flexibility in the interpretation of the requirements of targeted 
metadata surveillance as soon as this does not pose a serious interference to the fundamental 
rights to privacy (Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR)) and data 
protection (Article 8 EUCFR).  
 
Factual background 
On 16 February 2015, Mr Hernández Sierra, a Spanish national, was the a victim of a robbery 
that resulted in the theft of his wallet and his mobile telephone and left him seriously injured.  
Following this incident, the police requested the Court of Preliminary Investigation in 
Tarragona, Spain to order the various telephone operators to communicate a) the telephone 
numbers which had been activated, between 16 and 27 February 2015, with the ‘International 
Mobile Equipment Identity’ (IMEI) code - the unique identification code, consisting of 15 
digits, generally found inside the battery compartment of a mobile phone- of the stolen mobile 
telephone; and, b) the personal data of the owners or users of all the telephone numbers 
corresponding to the SIM cards activated by that IMEI code. The Court of Preliminary 
Investigation refused that request, on the grounds that the Spanish Criminal Code limited the 
communication of the data retained by the telephone operators to serious offences, namely, 
those punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than five years, while the facts at issue 
did not constitute a serious offence.  
 
The preliminary reference questions 
The Spanish Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Fiscal) -the only party to the proceedings- 
appealed against that order before the Provincial Court of Tarragona, which decided to stay the 
proceedings and refer two preliminary questions to the CJEU which concerned the 
interpretation of the concept of ‘serious crime’. More particularly, in its first question, the 
Provincial Court asked whether the sufficient seriousness of offences, as a criterion which 
justifies interference with the fundamental rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR, can 
be determined by taking into account only the sentence which may be imposed in respect of 
the offence investigated, or whether it is also necessary to identify in the criminal conduct 
particular levels of harm to individual and/or collective legally-protected interests. If the CJEU 
were to find in favour of the former, namely that the seriousness of the offence can be 
determined only on the basis of the prescribed sentence, the Spanish Court in its second 
question requested a clarification on what should be the minimum threshold for this and 
whether a minimum of three years’ imprisonment would be compatible with the requirements 
of EU law.  
 
Legal background 
The preliminary reference questions of the Spanish Court concern the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘serious crime’ as a criterion for the assessment of the lawfulness and 
proportionality of the interference of metadata surveillance measures with the rights to privacy 
and data protection enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR. In order to fully understand the legal 
context within which the concept of ‘serious crime’ appeared, we need to take a look at two 
judgments of the CJEU which referred to this:  Digital Rights and Tele2.  
 
Digital Rights  
In Digital Rights, the CJEU annulled Directive 2006/24/EC (the ‘Data Retention Directive’) 
on the basis that the mass, indiscriminate metadata retention that this established interfered 
disproportionately with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection in the light of 
Article 52 (1) EUCFR. Article 52 (1) EUCFR provides that any limitation on the exercise of 
the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter should i) be provided for by law, ii) meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the EU, iii) be necessary and proportionate, and iv) 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. It should be recalled that the Data Retention 
Directive obliged the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or 
networks to retain communications’ metadata generated or processed by them, in order to 
ensure that these were available for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution 
of serious crime. The CJEU held in that case that the purpose of fighting ‘serious crime’, such 
as terrorism or organised crime,  is indeed an ‘objective of general interest’ recognised by the 
EU and while metadata retention can be a ‘valuable tool for criminal investigations’, such an 
objective of general interest, ‘however fundamental it may be, does not, in itself, justify a 
retention measure such as that established by [the Data Retention] Directive being considered 
to be necessary for the purpose of that fight’. 
 
Tele2 
In Tele2, the CJEU had to consider national metadata retention laws -the Swedish one and the 
UK’s Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (‘DRIPA’)- after the invalidation of 
the EU Data Retention Directive. It held that EU law precludes national legislation which, for 
the purpose of fighting crime, provides for general and indiscriminate retention of all metadata 
of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication. It also 
stated that EU law precludes national legislation governing the protection and security of 
electronic communications metadata and, in particular, access of the competent national 
authorities to the retained data, where the objective pursued by that access, in the context of 
fighting crime, ‘is not restricted solely to fighting serious crime’ (emphasis added), ‘where 
access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, and 
where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be retained within the European 
Union.’  
 
The AG’s Opinion 
In Ministerio Fiscal, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe had to consider whether EU law allows the 
access of police authorities to metadata retained by electronic communications service 
providers for the purpose of identifying individuals in the context of a criminal investigation 
even if this does not constitute a ‘serious crime’. The AG commenced his analysis explaining 
why Ministerio Fiscal was different from Digital Rights and Tele2. 
 
Targeted vs. mass surveillance 
According to the AG, the central issue that distinguishes Ministerio Fiscal from Digital Rights 
and Tele2 is the fact that the police request at issue seeks to obtain only data that would make 
it possible to identify the owners or users of the telephone numbers linked with the SIM cards 
that were inserted in the stolen mobile telephone. Therefore, it concerns a clearly defined period 
of short duration (around 12 days); a restricted -rather than unlimited- number of persons 
capable of being affected by the measure (those who have used the stolen telephone after it was 
taken or those suspected of being connected with the perpetrators of this crime); personal data 
(such as forenames, surnames and addresses) related only to the above individuals -and not 
every type of metadata-; with the aim to gather information about certain natural persons -and 
not general information about location and communications as such-. The request, thus, entails 
a targeted measure that can be distinguished from general, indiscriminate surveillance.  
 
Assessing serious crime 
Having established that the case at issue concerned targeted rather than mass surveillance, the 
AG went on to answer the first question of the Spanish Court regarding the factors that must 
be taken into account for establishing that a crime is sufficiently ‘serious’ to justify an 
interference with Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR. The AG recalled that the concept of ‘serious crime’ 
does not appear in the ePrivacy Directive, but it was mentioned in the -invalidated- Data 
Retention Directive and subsequently used by the CJEU in Tele2 to ensure consistency with 
EU law of national surveillance measures. The AG considered that before answering the 
question of the national court he needed to reformulate this as the interference at issue in the 
case is not ‘sufficiently serious’. 
 
‘Sufficiently serious’ interference    
The AG admitted that operations such as those in the present case constitute an interference 
with Articles 7 and EUCFR even if the personal data concerned are not particularly sensitive, 
nevertheless this interference is not ‘sufficiently serious’ to ‘give rise to the need for enhanced 
justification’ for the following reasons: it concerns targeted, rather than mass, undifferentiated 
surveillance; it entails limited harmful effects for the persons concerned; access to the metadata 
is accompanied by procedural guarantees under Spanish law, such as review by a court; and 
the type of data requested and the limited  scope of the request do not make it possible to ‘obtain 
varied and/or specific information about the persons concerned and therefore do not directly 
and seriously affect their right to a private life’. Furthermore, Article 15 (1) of the ePrivacy 
Directive, which lists the objectives capable of justifying national legislation derogating from 
the principle of confidentiality of electronic communications includes the objective of ‘the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences’, without further 
qualification as to the nature of those offences. Therefore, according to this, the AG opined 
that only where ‘the interference is ‘particularly serious’, ‘the offences capable of justifying 
such an interference must themselves be particularly serious’. In the case of a non-serious 
interference, it is necessary to go back to the basic principle that emerges from the wording of 
article 15 (1) ePrivacy Directive, namely that ‘any type of criminal offence is capable of 
justifying such an interference’.  
 
Commentary and what’s next? 
It still remains to be seen if AG’s Saugmandsgaard Øe Opinion will be adopted by the CJEU. 
The Opinion, nevertheless, does not seem to deviate substantially from the strict requirements 
regarding communications metadata surveillance imposed by previous case-law as the factual 
circumstances are significantly distinct. Ministerio Fiscal concerns a measure of targeted 
surveillance, of limited scope that does not affect every individual and is accompanied by 
judicial safeguards. In this regard, the Opinion of the AG confirms to an extent what we already 
knew from Digital Rights and Tele 2, that there exist types of targeted surveillance that could 
be compatible with EU law, even if they concern criminal offences that are not necessarily 
serious.  
 
Does this mean that Member States, such as the UK, should no longer be concerned about their 
domestic metadata retention regimes? The answer is unequivocally, no. Measures, such as the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (‘IPA’) still do not comply with EU law, no matter whether the 
CJEU will agree with its AG in Ministerio Fiscal. The interception of communications 
metadata in bulk of every user and the lack of prior review by a court -as mandated in IPA- 
still presents a serious interference to the fundamental rights to privacy, data protection and 
freedom of expression and cannot, therefore, allow for access to the retained data for the 
purposes of fighting any crime -irrespective of its severity-, following the pronouncements of 
the AG in Ministerio Fiscal.  
 
Mass indiscriminate metadata retention for criminal purposes still remains extremely 
problematic even if the CJEU follows its AG’s suggestions in Ministerio Fiscal. It should be 
recalled that in that case, albeit the facts not being very clear, the AG accepted that there was 
a valid reason for the retention of such metadata by telecommunications’ service providers in 
the first place under Spanish law in compliance with the ePrivacy Directive. If, however, this 
premise is lacking and communications metadata were not retained in accordance with the 
ePrivacy Directive, the analysis regarding the seriousness of the interference and the 
concomitant requirement of seriousness of crime will not be applicable.   
 
The AG’s analysis in Ministerio Fiscal can be criticised for lacking clear guidance on this point 
that is fundamental for the CJEU’s decision and the criteria that national legislators need to 
follow in order to put in place surveillance measures that comply with EU law. When should 
it be considered that the retained by communications’ providers metadata to which the police 
authorities seek access, for the purposes of an investigation, have been archived by the 
operators in order to comply with an obligation complying with EU law? The AG accepts that 
this is the case in Ministerio Fiscal without any further discussion or clarification on the matter. 
The Opinion, thus, raises further questions regarding the dichotomy between retention of 
metadata and access to this by law enforcement authorities (these issues are discussed in detail 
in my book on The Fundamental Right to Data Protection: Normative Value in the Context of 
Counter-Terrorism Surveillance). Finally, the AG’s justification of access to metadata 
irrespective of the severity of the crime in cases such as the one at issue on the basis that this 
does not present a ‘serious interference’ is artificial, unduly complex and ultimately not 
convincing. While I agree with his conclusion, the justification should have been based on a 
simple application of the principle of proportionality in cases of targeted surveillance measures, 
rather than the creation of an artificial distinction between measures that pose a serious 
interference to fundamental rights and those that do not, that causes even further uncertainty.     
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